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Defending Miranda* 
by Paul Marcus** 
INTRODUCTION 
NUMBER 1 
I write to defend the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 1 
It may seem odd to feel the need to defend a well-established Supreme 
Court decision issued more than twenty years ago. In recent years, how-
ever, a strongly critical drive led by representatives of the United States 
Justice Department2 has received much publicity in the call to overrule 
Miranda. I believe Miranda is good law, is good policy, and has an impor-
tant and positive impact on our society. Before turning specifically to the 
Court's decision, however, it is important to consider generally the de-
bate over the use of confessions in criminal cases. After all, that really 
is what Miranda is all about. 
What are we to do about confessions? Some would say they are a vi-
tal part of our criminal justice system and all should be done to encourage 
them. Indeed, on a panel recently with a police chief of a major metropoli-
tan area, I heard the chief speak about how Miranda has interrupted the 
developing ''art of interrogating and eliciting confessions.'' I am not sure 
exactly what the "art" is, but he spoke in glowing terms of confessions 
as the cornerstone of our criminal justice system. 
*This essay is based upon a lecture given in March 1988, at the University of Wyo-
ming College of Law. 
**Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. 
1. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
2. In February 1986, the Office of Legal Policy of the United States Justice Depart-
ment issued a lengthy report discussing the use of confessions in criminal cases. See U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL PoLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE 
LAW OF PRE· TRIAL INTERROGATION (Feb. 12, 1986) [hereinafter JusTICE DEPT. REPORT]. The 
Report concluded by noting that 
Miranda v. Arizona was a decision without a past .... Miranda v. Arizona is 
a decision without a future .... [It] drifts on twenty years later, a derelict on 
the waters of the law. There is every reason to believe that an effort to correct 
this situation would be successful .... The potential benefits from success in 
this effort are very great. 
ld. at 114-15. 
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Others, on the other hand, such as Dean Wigmore, have been more 
circumspect in their review of confessions. He has stated that "any sys· 
tern of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually 
to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof, must itself suffer 
morally thereby."3 And, as Justice Goldberg pointed out in Escobedo v. 
Illinois:4 
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that 
a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on 
the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more 
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evi· 
dence independently secured through skillful investigation. 5 
Actually, most people, and I put myself in this group as well, fall some-
where between the harsh criticism of the use of confessions found in Dean 
Wigmore's writings, and Justice Goldberg's opinion in Escobedo, and the 
kind of trusting heavy reliance that my police chief friend would place 
on confessions. I suspect most of us would have little difficulty in relying 
heavily on the confession if we were absolutely convinced that it was given 
in a free and voluntary sense, with the suspect making a knowing and 
informed decision to speak. 
DISCUSSION 
The Voluntariness Test 
In much of our history, the only real question in connection with con· 
fessions was simply the voluntariness issue: did the defendant freely and 
knowingly speak? The voluntariness test, of course, arose under the due 
process clause. For most of our history, and the rule continues today, the 
test has been as stated by Justice Frankfurter: 
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and uncon· 
strained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, 
it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been over· 
borne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, 
the use of his confession offends due process. 6 
The voluntariness test works very well in the extreme and revolting 
cases which, unfortunately, we have seen throughout our history. An 
example is Brown v. Mississipp~ 7 where the suspect was hanged by a rope 
to the limb of a tree, whipped, whipped again, and told that the whippings 
would continue until he confessed. He confessed. His confession was cer-
tainly involuntary. Consider also Brooks v. Florida, 8 where the defendant 
was ordered confined for thirty-five days in a very small cell with no fur· 
3. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE 
at 309 (3rd Ed. 1940)). 
4. 378 u.s. 478 (1964). 
5. ld. at 488·89 (footnote omitted). 
6. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). 
7. 297 u.s. 278 (1936). 
8. 389 u.s. 413 (1967). 
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nishings and was given a restricted diet consisting entirely of peas and car-
rots in a soup form three times daily. The defendant confessed after spend-
ing fourteen days incommunicado. His confession was also ruled involun-
tary. Alas, such cases are not necessarily ancient history. While Brown 
was a 1936 case and Brooks a 1967 case, there are also more recent cases 
such as Leon v. State, 9 decided in 1982. There the police "threatened and 
physically abused [the defendant) by twisting his arm behind his back and 
choking him until he revealed where [the victim] was being held."10 In these 
extreme cases the voluntariness test seems to work reasonably well. 11 
What of cases, however, in which we do not see physical violence, 
where the threats and pressure involved are more subtle, or where there 
is genuine confusion as to whether or not the suspect really understands 
the guaranteed rights? Consider, for instance, Lynumn v. Illinois. 12 The 
suspect there was arrested for dealing in narcotics. The officer told her 
that she could receive ten years for this offense and her children would 
be taken away. She testified at the trial, that the arresting officer told 
her that "after I got out they would be taken away and strangers would 
have them, and if I could cooperate he would see that they weren't; and 
he would recommend leniency and I had better do what they told me if 
I ever wanted to see my kids again. " 13 The two children were three and 
four years old. Recall also cases such as Jurek v. Estelle, 14 where the defen-
dant was arrested at one o'clock in the morning, was kept away from his 
family for almost two full days, was not given an attorney, was moved 
three to four times during this period, and the evidence showed that he 
had a verbal I.Q. of sixty-six. 
In cases like Lynumn and Jurek, the voluntariness test becomes much 
more difficult to apply. Moreover, the voluntariness test really requires 
the appellate courts to sit essentially as jurors to determine whether or 
not the facts bear out the conclusion that the defendant's statement was 
freely and openly given. In addition, sole reliance on the due process pro-
visions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments neglects treatment of 
other constitutional provisions which affect the use of confessions. Illegal 
searches under the fourth amendment which result in confessions - every 
law student's nightmare, the fruit of the poisonous tree problem15 - affect 
the admissibility of the statements. 16 The sixth amendment right to coun-
9. 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
10. Id. at 202. 
11. The court in Leon, surprisingly, held that the confession had been voluntarily given, 
as the purpose of the police action was to find the victim and save his life, not to get a con-
fession. Id. at 203. 
12. 372 u.s. 528 (1963). 
13. Id. at 531. 
14. 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979), rev 'den bane, 623 F.2d 929 (1980). 
15. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), in its reliance on "tainted fruit" 
and "purged" and "attenuated" evidence, remains a considerable source of confusion and 
terror in the basic criminal procedure course. 
16. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the defendant was unlawfully arrested 
and taken to the police station. There he was given his Miranda warnings, and he confessed. 
The confession was found to be inadmissible under the fourth amendment because it was 
the direct result of the illegal detention. 
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sel is also very important because it deals with the issue of a suspect's 
right to confer with an attorney in connection with questioning. 1' And 
focusing exclusively on the due process clause neglects the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incri~ation. 18 
The Decision in Miranda 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s Justices of the Supreme Court were 
frustrated. They were hearing a large number of confession cases focus-
ing on voluntariness rules. The Court attempted to deal with confession 
problems in a host of different ways, such as by requiring prompt appear-
ances before magistrates19 and giving guidelines with respect to the use 
of physical force in connection with confessions.20 Still, nothing worked 
in a great many cases. The cases kept coming, the fact patterns were egre-
gious, and ultimately, seemingly in utter frustration, five members of the 
Court decided to adopt a rule. 
Now there are some, and Justice Harlan is certainly among them, who 
bristle at having a rule. After all, our Supreme Court is not permitted to 
give policy recommendations or advisory opinions because of the case or 
controversy requirement. 21 Justice Harlan railed against what he referred 
to as the Supreme Court's "new code" of criminal procedure in Miranda. 22 
Still, it seems to me, that having a clear and straightforward rule has 
served both suspects and law enforcement officials well. Indeed, I have 
always been puzzled by the firestorm created by Miranda. Police officers 
were given virtual "carte blanche." If they gave the Miranda warnings, 
the odds were excellent that the confession would be admissible. Miranda 
should also have encouraged legislative activists. The Court told legisla-
tors that following Miranda would essentially insure that confessions will 
be admissible. Yet legislators were encouraged to experiment and provide 
rights that are equal to those provided under Miranda. The Court specifi-
cally stated that: 
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable 
search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of 
the individuals while promoting efficient enforcement of our crimi-
nal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which 
are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right 
of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise 
it, the [Miranda] safeguards must be observed.23 
17. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Brewer v. Williams, 430 
u.s. 387 (1977). 
18. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was incorporated to apply 
against the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), just two years before Miranda. 
19. Resulting in the sCH:alled McNabb/Mallory rule. See McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
20. See, e.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) [hereinafter Beecher I); Beecher 
v. Alabama, 408 U.S. 234 (1972) [hereinafter Beecher II). 
21. u.s. CONST. art. III, §2. 
22. 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
23. ld.. at 467 (majority opinion). 
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It appears, however, that legislative activists have declined the Court's 
invitation to search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the 
accused's rights while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal 
laws. 24 
What, then, did the Supreme Court write in Miranda? Was the hold-
ing confusing, lengthy, complicated, difficult to understand? Not at all. 
The holding in Miranda is straightforward and simple and has been printed 
on thousands of little cards that police officers carry around with them 
all the time. What the Court said was that under the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, if two preconditions are met, warn-
ings have to be given in connection with police interrogation. What are 
the preconditions? First, this ruling does not apply unless the person is 
in custody, unless that individual's freedom of movement has been limited 
in a significant way.25 So when the IRS agents come to your house, and 
in that informal setting ask you some questions, Miranda simply does 
not apply. 26 When you go to the police station, on a purely voluntary basis, 
not being directed to come there, Miranda does not apply because you 
are not in custody. 27 Second, the confession must be one which was 
given in response to interrogation. Now it does not have to be formal ques-
tioning - it can be actions designed to elicit a response - but there has 
to be some form of interrogation. 28 So, when the suspect is being finger-
printed or photographed and blurts something out, Miranda does not 
apply. 
If the suspect is in custody and is interrogated, in order for the state-
ment to be admissible against the defendant to prove his guilt at trial, 29 
he has to be given four warnings. The warnings do not have to be in set 
form, 30 nor do they have to be in writing. Still, the gist of these warnings 
must be given: (1) you have the right to remain silent; (2) anything you 
say can and will be used against you; (3) you have a right to have an attor-
ney with you during the questioning; and (4) if you can't afford an attor-
ney, we'll get you one for free. 
That is it. That is all Miranda requires. All the warnings can fit on 
a little three by five card; every school child watching television or the 
24. The only attempt to legislatively overrule Miranda resulted in a codification of the 
voluntariness test. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982). 
25. Generally, the determination of whether an interrogation was "custodial" is a ques· 
tion of fact which is to be made on a case-by-case basis. See United States v. Phelps, 443 
F.2d 246, 247 (5th Cir. 1971). The most important facts are those which indicate that the 
accused had, or did not have, an objectively reasonable belief that he was not free to leave 
the interrogation. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984); see also Oregon v. Mathia· 
son, 429 U.S. 492, 496 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
26. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). 
27. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 492. 
28. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
29. A major limitation is that the earlier statement can be used at trial to challenge 
the defendant's contrary trial testimony, to impeach or discredit the testimony. See Harris 
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
30. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981). 
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movies knows the warnings. 31 Those are the rules, nothing more techni-
cal than that. 
Why then do we hear this great furor? Why is it that Miranda has 
generated controversy which continues twenty years after it was decided 
and we hear calls for the overruling of Miranda? First, I believe that this 
great controversy, in fact, is not much of a controversy. The furor is not 
much of a furor; the calls to overrule Miranda are relatively few and far 
between. Essentially, you hear these calls from a few law professors32 and 
a few individuals in the Reagan administration's Justice Department. 33 
You do not generally hear them from police officers, police chiefs or 
prosecuting attorneys throughout the United States. Criminal justice 
professionals who have studied the issues, by and large, appear to sup-
port Miranda, or at least they do not strongly ask for its overruling. As 
I will point out later, 34 even some vociferous critics of Miranda have essen-
tially stopped their criticism and accepted the reality that the opinion is 
here to stay. 
The Criticism 
I will focus here on the three principal points made by critics of 
Miranda: first, that it is not soundly based constitutional law, looking to 
the language and the history of the fifth amendment; second, that the 
system does not work, the warnings have become rote, and there are bet-
ter ways of handling the problem; third, that it really works too well, that 
fewer people confess, and the fears at the time of Miranda still apply. 
The fifth amendment provides in part that: "No person shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The chief argu-
ment traditionally put forth by the critics of Miranda, and especially 
Justice Harlan, is that neither the text of the fifth amendment nor its 
historical development prior to 1966 supports the rule in Miranda. The 
fifth amendment language, of course, provides little direct support for 
Miranda, but instead raises all sorts of questions: does the constitutional 
principle apply only to the trial setting, does it apply only to physical com· 
pulsion, does it involve pretrial confrontations? Few have argued that the 
language itself strongly supports the conclusion that compulsion under 
the fifth amendment is somehow synonymous with coercion under the 
voluntariness test of the Due Process Clause. 35 
31. Ample precedent exists to demonstrate the point. From the sphere of television, 
see Miami Vice, Police Story, and Jake and the Patman for particularly careful renditions 
of the warnings. From the world of cinema, see Mel Gibson in Lethal Weapon, Eddie Mur-
phy in 48 Hours, and Sylvester Stallone in Nighthawks, where prominent recitations of the 
warnings were featured. 
32. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417 (1985); Grano, Miranda 
v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. 
' CRIM. L. REV. 243 (1986). 
33. See JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra note 2. 
34. See infra notes 52, 59-62 and accompanying text. 
35. This point is made forcefully by the author of the JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra 
note 2. See Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical Perspective, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 
193 (1986). 
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It is also fair to say that the historical development concerning the 
fifth amendment lent little direct support to the Miranda ruling. It was 
only a few years before Miranda that the self-incrimination clause was 
even applied to the states. 36 Prior to 1966, the interpretation issues sur-
rounding the self-incrimination clause primarily revolved around situa-
tions in which defendants were literally compelled to speak by threat of 
physical coercion or specific penalty. 37 
Some critics also contend that Miranda does not work well in enforc-
ing constitutional principles. Undoubtedly this is correct to some extent, 
for conviction rates remain high and confession use continues through-
out the nation.38 Moreover, it is asserted, there are better ways of han-
dling the problem in terms of devices which will insure that confessions 
are not compelled: set time limits on interrogations, video taping of inter-
rogations, and the infusion of neutral magistrates into the questioning 
process.39 
The final argument, and perhaps the major one offered by most critics 
of Miranda, is to the contrary: Miranda impedes effective law enforcement 
because it works far too well. The critics argue that there is empirical evi-
dence to support the view that Miranda has caused fewer confessions to 
be used, hampering the investigation of serious crimes. In addition, the 
argument is made that it is difficult to discern the extent of the damage 
because the widespread communication of information about Miranda has 
led to individuals being unwilling to talk, totally apart from any police 
conduct relating to interrogation. 40 
In Defense 
I want now to take the opportunity to respond to the points which 
have been raised. First, as to whether Miranda is soundly based constitu-
tional law, I believe that it is.U It is undoubtedly true that the language 
of the fifth amendment, as written, does not directly support the holding 
in Miranda. It is also true that historically the founders did not explicitly, 
or even implicitly, seem to have in mind the requirements set forth in 
Miranda. Still, these conclusions should not be dispositive. The Constitu-
tion is not a detailed set of writings requiring us to fix on specific words 
with a precise meaning of provisions which never changes. What we look 
to is a living, vital Constitution which can change during the course of 
a lifetime, and certainly during the course of a 200-year history. Perhaps 
it is true that the drafters' original intent was not to have the Miranda 
36. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 1. 
37. See JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra note 2. 
38. The major studies respecting confession use and Miranda warnings are now quite 
dated. Moreover, even as to these studies, great debate has raged as to their reliability. See 
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1987); Markman, The Fifth 
Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda", 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 938 (1987). 
39. See JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra note 2. 
40. See Markman, supra note 35. 
41. See generally White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplin, 39 VAND. 
L. REV. 1 (1986). 
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result; so be it. Original intent can indeed be looked to as a beacon or as 
a source of inspiration as to where we should be going and where we have 
been. 
We have never, however, felt locked in by original intent and properly 
so for several reasons. It is rarely clear what the original intent was. Are 
we looking to the states of mind of the draftsmen of the actual amend-
ment, those who voted for it, those who were in Congress at the time, the 
majority of the population at the time? Also, times change, conditions 
change, and we certainly will not lock ourselves in forever to a particular 
and narrow reading of the Constitution. Probably the clearest example 
of this is Gideon v. Wainwright. 42 Undoubtedly the drafters never 
imagined that an individual would have to be told of a right to have a 
lawyer present during court proceedings, pretrial proceedings, and post-
trial proceedings, and that the state would provide an attorney. Fun-
damental fairness and a changing sense of sixth amendment requirements, 
however, have altered that view. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, a strong 
opponent of broad readings of the Constitution, has affirmed Gideon.43 
For some, the major problem with Miranda is that warnings are 
required, and that it is the warnings regarding remaining silent and hav-
ing a lawyer present which are the chief culprits. It is clear, however, that 
we require warnings in other settings with hardly a blink of the eye. Again, 
Gideon is an excellent example of this point. We would never imagine that 
an individual could waive her right to counsel without having first been 
expressly advised that she had a right to her own lawyer or a state pro-
vided attorney. While it is also true that the Supreme Court has refused 
to extend warning requirements to other areas, 44 those other areas do not 
42. 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
43. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). See also Chief Justice Burger's comment regard· 
ing unarticulated rights in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 
(1980): 
I d. 
The State argues that the Constitution nowhere spells out a guarantee 
for the right of the public to attend trials, and that accordingly no such right 
is protected. The possibility that such a contention could be made did not escape 
the notice of the Constitution's draftsmen; they were concerned that some 
important rights might be thought disparaged because not specifically guaran· 
teed .... 
But arguments such as the State makes have not precluded recognition 
of important rights not enumerated. Notwithstanding the appropriate caution 
against reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court 
has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated 
guarantees. For example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right 
to be presumed innocent, and the right to be judged by a standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, 
appear nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these important but 
unarticulated rights have nonetheless been found to share constitutional pro-
tection in common with explicit guarantees. The concerns expressed by Madi-
son and others have thus been resolved; fundamental rights, even though not 
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the Court as indispensable to 
the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined. 
44. Note especially the Court's refusal to require warnings in connection with consent 
searches. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
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deal with an individual's own words, coming out of her own mouth, which 
would seem to necessitate a requirement of a warning that you do not 
have to talk and you can have the assistance of counsel. 
It is also argued that Miranda does not work. It is difficult for me 
to take this argument too seriously. As a matter of common sense and 
instinct, we all know that it does work. ' 5 Essentially we all now know that 
we have the right to remain silent and we have a right to an attorney; 
the Miranda warnings reinforce this knowledge. Moreover, one of the key 
points with regard to the effectiveness of the warnings is not simply focus· 
ing on the defendant's understanding of his rights. While information 
about the warnings is widespread, undoubtedly some defendants do not 
understand the rights or lose sight of them during a period of great emo· 
tion. More to the point, however, is the question of whether the police 
are willing to communicate to the defendant that they, the police officers, 
not only know the suspect's right, but by reciting those rights are willing 
to enforce and respect those rights. 46 
Miranda has done its job, it has communicated constitutional rights 
to individuals, and it reiterates those rights in highly emotionally charged 
settings. Moreover, I suppose I would ask the question that if Miranda 
does not work, what would? Would one replace Miranda with a specific 
statute talking about time limits, video tapes, perhaps the infusion of an 
independent magistrate? Perhaps such statutes would work well, although 
I am not at all convinced they would work better than Miranda. Miranda 
specifically invited the legislatures of the states and the federal govern· 
ment to experiment in the area. Have we seen such statutory approaches? 
Not at all.47 What we have seen has been a blatant and heavy-handed 
attempt to legislatively overrule Miranda and return to the voluntariness 
test. ' 8 Is that the test that we want, voluntariness, a case-by-case 
approach? The voluntariness test easily disposes of the physical violence 
cases. Unfortunately, it is much less easily applied to the defendant who 
is not very intelligent, the highly tense situation, the mentally ill defen-
dant, or cases of official deception. 
If the objection truly is that Miranda works too well, the critics prove 
too much. If those critics mean that individuals understand their rights 
now and may exercise those rights based upon a knowing and rational 
understanding of the constitutional principles, that is precisely what our 
Constitution stands for. We ought to applaud such a result. If those critics 
mean that conviction rates have dropped tremendously and that we see 
45. We instinctively know that Miranda works because the information concerning fifth 
amendment warnings has been communicated to virtually each and every citizen of the United 
States. Moreover, as pointed out by numerous supporters of Miranda, as well as a few critics, 
there has been no major impact of Miranda on conviction rates throughout the United States. 
See supra note 38 and infra notes 49, 50 and 52 and accompanying text. 
46. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 38. 
47. Former Attorney General Meese is about the only official who has recently advo-
cated a legislative attempt to overrule Miranda. See JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra note 2. 
48. With the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 which provides in part, "a confession ... 
shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." 
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many fewer confessions forming the basis for convictions, to be charita-
ble I would say the evidence, at best, is mixed. 49 
Most of the studies cited by the critics are old, and much has changed 
in the last twenty years in terms of police officer training, court systems, 
and perceptions of individual rights. Conviction rates remain high; con-
fession use appears to remain high. Indeed, as strong a critic of Miranda 
as Professor Caplan has indicated in a recent interview that essentially 
no one really knows what the impact of Miranda has been. Professor 
Caplan put the matter in rather striking terms: "So there's a lot of bull-
shit out there, because lawyers like to quote statistics when they don't 
have answers. " 50 Then District Attorney of Philadelphia, Arlen Spector, 
was highly critical of Miranda in testimony before a congressional com-
mittee in 1966.51 Twenty years later, Spector, now a United States Sena-
tor from Pennsylvania, noted that "whatever the preliminary indications 
were twenty years ago, I am now satisfied that law enforcement has 
become accommodated to Miranda and therefore I see no reason to turn 
the clock back."52 Indeed, Senator Spector's administrative assistant 
explained that the Senator's sharp criticism in 1966 "was based on statis-
tics gathered during a period of obvious transition, a time when the police 
were still in the process of getting used to Miranda.' '53 
The imagined horribles put forth twenty years ago, and which con-
tinue to be raised today, about how the use of Miranda will cripple the 
criminal justice system have not come to pass. Instinctively we know 
Miranda has worked and its impact on the criminal justice system has 
not been detrimental. 54 
CoNCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has not been overwhelmingly technical in apply-
ing Miranda when determining when a suspect is in custody. 55 The Court 
has not required any rigorous adherence to the precise wording of the warn-
ings in Miranda. 56 If a suspect takes the stand and then lies at trial about 
a prior confession, that prior confession can be used to impeach him. 57 The 
fact, albeit the disputed fact, is that Miranda works and works well. Those 
who were most critical when Miranda was first written have either tem-
pered their criticism or have withdrawn it. 58 Former Chief Justice Burger 
49. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 38. 
50. "The impact of the case has been ideological rather than empirical." Quoted in 
Thompson, Miranda Decision Still Stands After 2().. Year Debate, L.A. Daily J., June 13, 1986, 
at 1. 
51. Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Crim. Law, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-19 (19671. 
52. Quoted in Kamisar, Landmark Ruling's Had No Detrimental Effect, Boston Globe, 
Feb. 1, 1987, at A27. 
53. Kamisar, No Evidence of Harmful Effect, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 1. 
54. See supra note 45. 
55. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 420 (routine traffic stop is not custodial). 
56. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 355. 
57. Harris, 401 U.S. at 222. 
58. See, e.g., Senator Spector's co=ents, supra notes 51·53 and accompanying text. 
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stated: ''The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law 
enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither over-
rule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date."59 Justice White 
wrote: "We reconfirm these views ... [that) under Miranda [a suspect has 
a right] to remain silent and to be free of interrogation 'until he had con-
sulted with a lawyer.' "60 Justice O'Connor stated: "Were the court writ-
ing from a clean slate, I could agree with its holding [narrowing Miranda]. 
But Miranda is now the law and, in my view, the Court has not provided 
sufficient justification for departing from it or for blurring its now clear 
strictures."61 She said again that Miranda as written, "strikes the proper 
balance between society's legitimate law enforcement interests and the 
protection of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.''62 
Twenty years ago when Miranda was handed down the strongest 
critics of the decision were federal and state legislators who viewed the 
holding with tremendous alarm. I suppose it is a sign of how far we have 
come in accepting the basic principle behind Miranda that I can note that 
it is precisely those legislators who now embrace Miranda in a very differ-
ent setting. I refer here to the efforts to expand Miranda to the non-
custodial income tax investigation setting. Fifty-one senators recently 
introduced a bill which, if passed, would require revenue agents to allow 
investigated taxpayers the right to record the interviews. 53 The bill would 
also require that the agent "explain the audit process to the taxpayer and 
such taxpayer's rights under such process. If the taxpayer indicates in 
any manner and at any time during the interview that he wishes to con-
sult with an attorney ... such interview shall be discontinued .... " The 
bill, known as the "Omnibus Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act", is widely 
supported by, among others, Senators D'Amato, Hatch, Helms, and 
McCain. In addition, many nonpolitical groups throughout the country 
have urged support for a model bill which would require the IRS to give 
Miranda-type warnings to taxpayers. 64 
In short, if the most stringent of the critics of twenty years ago agree 
that Miranda works and agree that it ought not to be changed, we should 
agree as well. Indeed, to a very large extent, the substance of the debate 
over Miranda is irrelevant. The questions, it seems to me, ought to be 
what do we do about spiraling drug use, how do we identify and appre-
hend criminals, how do we process them in our system quickly, and what 
do we do about a prison population that is exploding in numbers. Miranda 
is essentially irrelevant to these matters. Soon after he stepped down as 
head of the National Crime Commission, now Harvard Law Dean James 
Vorenberg explained the impact of Miranda on the crime rate: 
59. Innis, 446 U.S. at 304. 
60. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981). 
61. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
62. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986). 
63. S. 1774, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
64. This "Bill of Rights" has been widely disseminated throughout the United States. 
I recently received a copy in conjunction with a written fund raising effort by a well-known 
charitable foundation. 
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When one considers that many of the crimes committed in this 
country are not reported to the police at all, that only one-fourth 
or one-fifth of the crime that is reported leads to arrest, and that 
only a small proportion are cases where a confession is crucial to 
solution; and when one also takes into account that in many cases 
since Miranda the suspect still confesses and that in many cases 
before Miranda he did not, what you are left with is "maybe a frac-
tion of 1 percent of all crime that might be affected by a change 
in the Miranda rule. " 65 
Miranda was good law twenty years ago, in 1966, and it should be 
kept, reaffirmed, and strengthened. Miranda communicated rights to 
individuals and made clear to law enforcement officials that they are bound 
by specific professional standards. It was good law and policy then, as 
it is today. 
65. Quoted in Kamisar, supra note 53. 
